The EC also announced new sanctions concerning the Russian shadow fleet: an additional 30 vessels will be added to the EU's sanctions list of 632 ships, although the names of these vessels are not disclosed.
For the first time, restrictions will be imposed on vessels providing services to the Russian shadow fleet, including bunkering services (refueling). Limitations may also be enacted regarding ports and airports involved in the sale of Russian oil, as well as oil refineries utilizing raw materials from Russia. Finally, the sale of LNG tankers to Russia will be restricted.
Restrictions on LNG Carriers
EU countries have never sold tankers for transporting liquefied natural gas (LNG) to Russia. LNG projects by NOVATEK — "Yamal LNG" and "Arctic LNG-2" — operate vessels built in South Korea. One LNG carrier for the "Arctic LNG-2" project, "Alexey Kosygin," was built and handed over to the customer by the Russian shipyard Zvezda at the end of 2025.
Sergey Tereshkin, CEO of the petroleum products marketplace Open Oil Market, reminded us that most tankers for "Yamal LNG" were produced by South Korea’s Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering (DSME). "Perhaps the EU attempted to close a loophole that formally remained in the legislation retroactively. However, it would be challenging to exploit such a loophole given the overall sanctions backdrop," he mentioned.
The Centre for Pricing Indices (CPI) noted that there are no shipyards in the EU for building tankers, but there are repair yards for servicing them, particularly in Denmark. "It is possible that sanctions will include the servicing and repair of Russian LNG tankers," they suggested. The CPI believes that with new measures, the EU aims to "pressure" all consumers of Russian oil, including the largest buyers — China, India, and Turkey.
Managing Partner of Kasatkin Consulting Dmitry Kasatkin states that the primary risks for LNG are not so much related to direct supplies of new vessels from Europe but rather to services for the already functional fleet—technical maintenance, insurance, and vessel servicing. "For ongoing LNG projects, there will be no effect unless sanctions hit existing long-term contracts and vessel servicing. This measure may be more sensitive for new Arctic LNG projects, as specialized ice LNG carriers are difficult to replace: they are expensive, scarce, and technologically complex. However, this will likely lead to more complicated supply chains rather than an inability to purchase LNG carriers," he opined.
Advisor to the Rector of RGSU, Doctor of Economics Konstantin Pozdnyakov stated that restrictions on the supply of LNG carriers include a ban on the technical servicing of Russian vessels transporting liquefied gas, and from January 2027, providing terminal services for Russian LNG will become illegal. This will create difficulties for European ship repair companies and terminal operators. He believes that companies providing auxiliary services to the shadow fleet (primarily, bunkering vessels for refueling ships at sea) and operators of technical support vessels and insurance companies will be the most vulnerable. For shipowners, this represents a significant increase in compliance risks, as even a one-time provision of services to a tanker from the shadow fleet may lead to inclusion in the sanctions list and loss of access to European ports and financial services, according to the expert.
The Shadow Fleet and Foreign Ports
Kasatkin believes that the effect on Russian service vessels operating with the shadow fleet will be limited. For shipowners, this means increased risks, higher insurance costs, and challenges with chartering, repairs, and port entry. However, for the established logistics, the impact is not critical: supply chains can be restructured through other jurisdictions and service points.
Tereshkin thinks that sanctions against companies servicing the shadow fleet may theoretically complicate oil export logistics temporarily. However, there will be no long-term effect, owing to regular re-registration of shadow fleet vessels and the release of some tankers following a sharp easing of sanctions against Venezuela.
Commenting on possible sanctions against foreign seaports, Kasatkin noted that Russian oil and oil products mainly leave for export through East Asian and Middle Eastern infrastructure: ports in Western India, oil terminals in China's Shandong province and along the east coast, Turkish ports and refineries, as well as certain transshipment and blending hubs in Southeast Asia and the Middle East. Pozdnyakov stated that the primary recipients of Russian oil from 2024 to 2026, following the european embargo, will be India and China. "The key offloading ports are India's Jamnagar and Vadinar, as well as Chinese terminals servicing independent refineries," the expert explained.
Sanctions against ports and refineries working with Russian raw materials could theoretically affect the largest Indian and Turkish companies. However, the European Union does not have direct leverage over the infrastructure facilities of third countries," noted Pozdnyakov. "New restrictions may create additional compliance risks for such facilities, but are unlikely to halt supplies," added Kasatkin. "These measures are not directly aimed at the end consumers of Russian oil, and the further the sanctions measure is from the final consumer, the less transparent the chain is, making it easier to restructure." There is unlikely to be any effect on airports, he noted. "A separate question is how all these restrictions will be enforced and monitored. We presume that the European markets are opaque to the EU, and the enforcement of sanctions will be rather formal," Kasatkin concluded.
Tereshkin believes that the new sanctions may be sensitive for Turkish refineries, which use Russian oil to produce petroleum products and further supply fuel to Europe. "The European Union has already imposed restrictions on the import of petroleum products produced using Russian oil. However, tracking such a ban is quite challenging, and thus new restrictions are being put in place to increase risks for refineries working with Russian raw materials," he explained.
"Indian and Turkish refineries will face a choice between maintaining access to the European market and continuing to purchase discounted Russian raw materials," explained Pozdnyakov. "Many may opt to redirect their export flows to the growing Asian market. The long-term consequences will depend on the coordination of actions between the EU, the USA, and the UK." According to him, new sanctions imply further increases in logistics costs for Russian exports and the need to develop maritime transport infrastructure without European contractors.
Source: RBC
