The agreement between the United States and Iran regarding the opening of the Strait of Hormuz, expected to be signed on June 19, 2026, will not only reshape the oil market but also the entire energy geopolitics of the coming years. Donald Trump announced on June 15 the readiness of a 14-point memorandum, prompting an immediate market reaction: Brent prices momentarily fell to $80 per barrel, resulting in a record drop in the shares of Russian companies (to the lows of 2022-23). This is not just another fluctuation in prices, but a turning point after which the logic of global energy trading will begin to operate differently.
However, it may be premature to rush to positivity. Participants in this standoff have negotiated before, so, as they say, we shall see. There are still 500 vessels "anchored" in Hormuz, and it is unclear who will go where and when. The fate of freight, which risks collapsing, is equally uncertain.
As for the deal, its terms appear to be sufficiently clear. Iran will demine the strait within 30 days and guarantee the unrestricted passage of vessels without duties and delays. The United States will gradually lift the maritime blockade. A ceasefire will be extended for 60 days across all fronts, including Lebanon. Simultaneously, two-month negotiations on Iran's nuclear program will commence, with the initial question being the disposal of highly enriched uranium. The U.S. vows to discuss easing sanctions and unblocking frozen Iranian assets, which, according to Axios, amount to approximately $24 billion.
The unfreezing of assets has been the main stumbling block in all previous negotiations. Other proposed points in the memorandum include respect for sovereignty, payments (up to $300 billion) to Iran for post-conflict recovery, Iran's renouncement of nuclear ambitions, and the subsequent signing of a final peace agreement.
The market reaction to yet another "Trump deal" was predictable in form, but not in scale.
In March 2026, prices swiftly exceeded $100 per barrel due to news background. Now, the same mechanism is working in reverse. Prices are not just falling; they are beginning to revert to levels that indicate a full recovery of shipping. According to the U.S. Department of Energy forecasts from June 9, Brent is expected to drop to $79 per barrel in 2027. Given the current market trends, this level could be approached sooner than the baseline scenario anticipated.
However, the baseline scenario and the real scenario are different things. The International Energy Agency, in its May report, warned that even with a peace agreement in place, the supply shortage will be felt until October 2026. The recovery chain for shipping includes several stages. First, demining takes the stated 30 days. Then insurers must restore coverage for tankers passing through the Persian Gulf. Operators of oilfields will gradually begin to bring production volumes out of conservation. This does not happen simultaneously; the entire process takes several months. This indicates that prices below $90 are not a matter of weeks, but rather of the second half of 2026 and into 2027.
The opening of the strait creates clear winners and losers, and the distribution does not align with traditional geopolitical understandings. Global oil consumers, primarily China and India, will regain supply from the Persian Gulf and see a noticeable decrease in energy prices. Iran will have the opportunity to restore exports, which is vital for the survival of its economy. The unfreezing of assets and gradual easing of sanctions will provide Tehran with resources to repair its damaged oil and gas infrastructure.
Paradoxically, the United Arab Emirates will also emerge as winners, as they left OPEC+ on May 1 precisely to gain the freedom to increase production without cartel agreement. ADNOC, the national oil company of the UAE, plans to increase its capacity to 5 million barrels per day by 2027. This increase of 1.5–1.6 million barrels per day will be feasible if Hormuz opens and shipping insurance is restored, allowing the Emirates to finally export these volumes to the global market instead of keeping them as mere intentions.
The losers will be oil producers outside the Persian Gulf. The opening of the strait means the market will face delayed supply. Between February and May 2026, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, and the UAE cut production by more than 11 million barrels per day. These volumes will begin to return to the market. Simultaneously, there could be a softening or complete lifting of the oil embargo on Iran as part of the package deal with the U.S. This will create a supply race in the Middle East, where each producer will attempt to increase sales while prices remain relatively high.
Russian exports are in a vulnerable position. With Brent at $95–107, exports operate within a comfortable price zone, providing the budget with significant additional income above the baseline price of $60 set in the budget rule. A rollback to $79–80 negates these advantages entirely.
It is still premature to speak of a full resumption of the transit of oil, petroleum products, and other cargoes through the Strait of Hormuz: we must wait for June 19, when the memorandum between the U.S. and Iran is to be signed. If transit resumes after the signing of the documents, Brent prices could drop to below $70 per barrel in a relatively short timeframe, according to Sergey Teryoshkin, CEO of Open Oil Market.
"Along with Brent prices, Urals prices will also decline: if in May 2026 the tax price of Russian oil, accounting for the spot quotes of Urals and Brent, was $86 per barrel, it could drop below $60 per barrel in summer.
Furthermore, little will change for Russian oil producers: oil production in Russia in May 2026 was only 300,000 barrels per day lower than in February, while Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Kuwait (the three other major participants in the OPEC+ deal) cut production by a total of more than 9 million barrels per day.
Overall, the oil market will start to return to normal in the second half of 2026.
This will manifest, among other things, by intensified competition among producers, considering the probable increase in production in the Middle East and potential easing of sanctions on Iran,” the expert says.
OPEC+ already agreed at the beginning of June to another increase in quotas of 188,000 barrels per day for July. This is not an increase — it is preparation for retreat. However, Russia's capabilities here are limited. In May 2026, oil production in Russia was only 300,000 barrels per day lower than in February, while Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Kuwait reduced production by more than 9 million barrels per day. This indicates that Russia is already close to its ceiling, while the Saudis have significant room to increase supplies.
Israel has taken a clear opposition stance toward the agreement. According to The Guardian and Israeli media, Tel Aviv believes the memorandum does not restrict Tehran's missile program and effectively solidifies Iran's gains. Former National Security Adviser to Prime Minister Netanyahu, Yaakov Nagel, called the proposed agreement "a major mistake." This creates a real risk that Israel may attempt to disrupt the implementation of the deal through a new incident in the region.
Republican critics of Trump also criticize the deal, albeit for different reasons. In the lead-up to the midterm elections, some in the Republican Party view the memorandum as a concession to Iran. This adds internal political uncertainty to its realization. Any major political event in the U.S. could reshape the dynamics surrounding the deal.
In practice, the implementation could unfold through three main scenarios.
The first, baseline scenario: signing on June 19, demining completed by mid-July, insurance restored in August. Brent moves towards $85–90 by the end of the third quarter and to $79–82 in 2027. This is the scenario laid out in the U.S. Department of Energy forecasts.
The second, more likely given the historical experience of such agreements: implementation stalls. The signing occurs, but demining proceeds slower than the stated 30 days, insurance returns with delays, and Israeli provocations or internal Iranian disagreements hinder the process. Prices rebound to $90–95 and remain there until the end of the year.
The third, worst-case scenario: a collapse. The deal is not signed on June 19, or it is signed but quickly falls apart due to a new incident. Prices spike above $100, and the market returns to the Hormuz crisis mode.
The main factor of uncertainty in the oil market in the second half of the year is the behavior of the UAE outside OPEC+
The Emirates can increase production in any manner and pace, without coordinating actions with the rest of the cartel. In this sense, they become the main source of price unpredictability. Russia can control its production within OPEC+, but it cannot control Tehran's or Abu Dhabi's decisions. This is precisely why June 19 is not just a date but a turning point for recalibrating all assumptions in the energy budget for 2026-2027.
Source: Vgudok
