In addition to infrastructure, the lists are set to include another 42 tankers, confirming the scale of the "inventory" of the shadow segment.
Behind the quantitative figures lies a qualitative change in the sanctions tactics. Brussels has realized that simply blocking vessels is ineffective: VG has already detailed the cases where tankers, once removed from classification societies or stripped of insurance, merely change their names, ownership, and flags, continuing operations through offshore chains. Now, the EU is targeting financial schemes - sanctions are being imposed on banks in Tajikistan, Laos, and Kyrgyzstan that facilitated transactions circumventing Western systems.
The everyday reality of the shadow fleet in recent years resembles an endless series with constant changes in settings. Under the pressure of secondary sanctions, Barbados and Panama have begun to revoke flags from vessels suspected of transporting Russian oil en masse. This has provoked a migration of the fleet to jurisdictions such as Gabon or the Comoros Islands, but has not halted the flow. The "gray" fleet possesses a remarkable ability to regenerate: in place of one liquidated operating company, like the Indian Gatik, several less noticeable entities quickly emerge.
The new EU initiative aims to deprive these vessels of basic life-supporting services. Restrictions on bunkering, repairs, and any technical maintenance in ports are an attempt to push "shadow operators" into a state of total autonomy, which is technically impossible for aging vessels that make up the backbone of the gray fleet.
"Sanctions against the shadow fleet are not fundamentally new: both the EU and the UK have repeatedly imposed restrictions on tankers transporting Russian oil.
Restrictions on servicing the shadow fleet's vessels in any EU sea ports could pose a much greater threat.
This encompasses not only insurance services but also any other operations, from oil transshipment in the territorial waters of EU countries to port calls in sea ports. "Second-type" restrictions could complicate export logistics and thereby increase the costs of exporting oil and oil products," said Sergey Tereshkin, CEO of Open Oil Market, to VG.
Despite the decisive tone of the European Commission, there is a lack of solidarity within the EU itself. Greece and Malta - countries with substantial trading fleets - have already opposed a ban on oil transportation services from Russia. For Athens, maritime shipping is not only a source of budget revenue but also a lever of influence in the global division of labor. Limiting the operations of Greek tankers with Russian crude automatically hands the market over to Asian or Middle Eastern players, which does not bode well for Mediterranean shipowners.
"Brussels is trying to impose political rules on a market that is inherently global and anarchic. We see that even with the imposition of strict measures, loopholes remain. The lifting of sanctions on two Chinese banks amid pressure on banks in Central Asia is an obvious nod to Beijing. This acknowledgment indicates that without China's involvement, any attempt to financially block maritime exports becomes illusory," notes a source in the maritime trade industry.
Indeed, the selectivity of sanctions underscores their political underpinning. By targeting the ports of Georgia and Indonesia, the EU aims to set a precedent that will make other neutral ports consider the risks. However, logistics always seeks the path of least resistance. Increased freight costs and rising insurance premiums are incorporated into the final price, while discounts on crude allow for compensation of these expenses.
The maritime industry is entering a period of ultimate fragmentation. The EU's efforts to block third-country ports and expand lists of tankers will not lead to an immediate halt in exports, but they are poised to radically alter its economics.
We are witnessing the formation of a "parallel" port infrastructure and financial circuits that operate beyond the reach of Western law.
If the 20th package is adopted in such a decisive form, it will accelerate the aging process of the global fleet (as new vessels will avoid toxic routes) and lead to further increases in logistical distances. For Russian exports, this means an inevitable rise in transportation costs and the need for investments in its own port infrastructure in friendly regions.
In reality, the anniversary sanctions package risks becoming the "last Chinese warning." The effectiveness of sanctions has become more a matter of public relations than economics. Behind the stern words lies neither unity in the EU nor unequivocal mass support from voters, nor a mechanism for total oversight of sanctions implementation. The waning influence of once-powerful European countries leads to a diminished risk of non-compliance with their imposed rules. As America's experience shows, to demand something, one must send an aircraft carrier. And there are no gunboats for all dissenters.
Source: Vgudok
